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CONCLUSION

It has become increasingly evident that the law governing the
awards of exemplary damages in joint defendant cases needs a substantial revision. No jurisdiction as of this late date in legal jurisprudence
has offered a completely satisfactory solution.
Once the basic purposes of exemplary damages are established,
it is evident that the doctrine of joint and several liability of joint
tort-feasors for exemplary damages is an anomaly in the law that has
no place in modern concepts of justice. Plaintiffs can be fully compensated for any injury or loss sustained by the award of compensatory
damages. Multiple defendants, however, need no longer be prejudiced
by liability for the full amount of compensatory damages. By providing
for pro rata contribution among joint defendants for compensatory
damages, each defendant will justly recompense a plaintiff in equal
shares for the total damages actually suffered. A joint tort-feasor who
acted wantonly or willfully in injuring the plaintiff, can be adequately
punished by the award of exemplary damages in an amount based upon
his own degree of culpability, and in an amount that will serve as an
adequate individual mulct. As there remains no valid reason for the
denial of apportionment of exemplary damages, there, in turn, can be
no valid reason for precluding a plaintiff from introducing evidence
of the financial wealth of one or more joint tort-feasors in actions in
which both compensatory and exemplary damages are sought.

A Test For Retroactivity In Criminal Cases
Schowgurow v. State'
The defendant, a Buddhist, was convicted of murder in the Circuit
Court for Cecil County, Maryland. Both before and during trial defendant made motions to dismiss on the ground that the grand jury and
the petit jury were selected in derogation of the first and fourteenth
amendments of the Constitution of the United States. The defendant
contended that persons of his religion were excluded from both juries
by article 36 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights,2 which requires
1. 240 Md. 121, 213 A.2d 475 (1965).
art. 36:
2. MD. DECLARATION op RIGHTs
That as it is the duty of every man to worship God in such a manner as he thinks
most acceptable to Him, all persons are equally entitled to protection in their
religious liberty; wherefore, no person ought by any law to be molested in his
person or estate, on account of his religious persuasion, or profession, or for his
religious practice, unless, under the color of religion, he shall disturb the good
order, peace or safety of the State, or shall infringe the laws of morality, or injure
others in their natural, civil or religious rights; nor ought any person be compelled
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jurors to believe in the existence of God. The lower court denied the
defendant's motion. On appeal the Maryland Court of Appeals reversed,
stating that the requisite belief in article 36 was in violation of the first
and fourteenth amendments, both on its face and as applied. The
court also carefully noted that its decision was retroactive only insofar
as it applied to cases not final' at the announcement of the decision.4
In State v. Madison,5 Schowgurow was applied to invalidate the
indictments of grand juries indicting all criminal defendants whose cases
were still pending at the time of the Schowgurow decision, regardless
of a defendant's religious belief or disbelief.'
These two cases have given rise to serious problems in Maryland.
Since Schowgurow and Madison, new juries have been drawn throughout the state. According to the Attorney General,7 from 2000 to 3000
persons required re-indictment. The validity of witness oaths has been
to frequent, or maintain, or contribute, unless on contract, to maintain, any place
of worship, or any ministry; nor shall any person otherwise competent, be deemed
incompetent as a witness, or juror, on account of his religious belief; provided,
he believes in the existence of God, and that under His dispensation such person
will be held morally accountable for his acts, and be rewarded or punished therefor
either in this world or in the world to come. (Emphasis added.)
3. The Court of Appeals points out in Hays v. State, 240 Md. 482, 214 A.2d 573
(1965), that the U.S. Supreme Court in a similar pronouncement on non-retroactivity
in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965), said that "final" meant after the availability of appeal had been exhausted.
4. It has been suggested that the federal courts are prohibited by the "case and
controversy" provision of the U.S. Constitution from making a rule retroactive until
the point is raised and argued before the court. See, e.g., Note, Prospective Overruling
and Retroactive Application in the Federal Courts, 71 YALE L.J. 907 (1962). While
there is no similar prohibition in the Maryland Constitution, the Court of Appeals has
said on a number of occasions that it does not render advisory opinions. See Tanner v.
McKeldin, 202 Md. 569, 580, 97 A.2d 449 (1952) ; Hammond v. Lancaster, 194 Md. 462,
71 A.2d 474 (1950). It could be argued that it would have been wiser if the Maryland
Court had refrained from deciding the retroactivity point until it was properly before
the Court. Perhaps a better result would have been forthcoming if the issue had been
fully briefed and argued before the Court.
5. 240 Md. 265, 213 A.2d 880 (1965). In this case Madison had been indicted
before the Schowgurow decision but had not yet been tried. He is a Seventh Day
Adventist who admits he believes in the existence of a Supreme Being. The State
argued that Madison could not question the validity of the indictment under Schowgurow because he was not a member of the excluded class, but the Court of Appeals
held that he did not have to have standing or show prejudice where the system of
jury selection was unconstitutional on its face; to require him to do so would violate
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
Therefore, since Madison's case was not final before Sehowgurow, his indictment
was dismissed.
6. Not long after the Madison decision, the Court of Appeals handed down two
more cases to clear up any confusion created by Schowgurow and Madison: Smith v.
State, 240 Md. 464, 214 A.2d 563 (1965) and Hays v. State, 240 Md. 482, 214 A.2d 573
(1965). Smith had been indicted but not tried at the time Schowgurow was handed
down. After consulting with his attorney, he waived his right to challenge his indictment under Schowgurow, and was tried and convicted in Baltimore City. After his
conviction he changed his mind and appealed on the ground that he could not waive
the defective indictment. The Court of Appeals said he could and affirmed his conviction.
The defendants in Hays had been convicted before Schowgurow, but their time for
appeal had not yet expired. On appeal they raised the Schowgurow point, but the
State argued that since they had not raised the point in the trial court, they had
impliedly waived their right to challenge the indictment. The Court of Appeals
reversed, holding that a defendant could not impliedly waive this point if his conviction
was not final before Schowgurow.
7. See The Evening Sun (Baltimore), Oct. 21, 1965, p. C22, col. 7.
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seriously questioned,' as has the constitutionality of our perjury laws.'
The Court of Appeals has already stated that the rule of Schowgurow
applies to civil cases. 10 The validity of acts of judges have been ques12
tioned." The cases may also have some affect on dying declarations.
Undoubtedly, other areas of the law may be affected, but the principal
concern here is the retroactivity of Schowgurow itself.' 3
8. In the Daily Record (Baltimore), Nov. 8, 1965, p. 2, col. 3, the Attorney
General of Maryland stated that it was his opinion that the witness oaths were valid,
but that in order to be completely safe, some slight changes should be made. A portion
of this opinion is set out below:
Our efforts in this direction are not to be construed as meaning that we harbor
any serious reservations regarding the applicability of the affirmation to nonbelievers. To the contrary . . . we are confident that the same may lawfully be
so utilized and we are prepared to defend that position.
In light of the aforegoing, we offer the following suggestions:
(1) The traditional oath - "In the presence of Almighty God, you do solemnly
promise and declare that the evidence which you will give to the Court (and Jury)
in the matter now pending before it (them) shall be the truth" - should continue
to be administered to all witnesses who do not first express a contrary desire.
[Author's note: notice that the traditional "so help me God" has been removed
from the oath.]
(2) The standard affirmation - "You do solemnly sincerely and truthfully
declare and affirm that the evidence which you will give to the Court (and Jury),
in the matter now pending before it (them), shall be the truth, the whole truth,
and nothing but the truth, and so, you do affirm" - should continue to be administered . . . to all witnesses who indicate that their refusal to take the oath is
predicated upon their disbelief in the existence of a Supreme Being and who
do not object to taking this form of affirmation.
(3) A modified affirmation - "You do declare and affirm that the evidence
which you will give to the Court (and Jury) in the matter now pending before it
(them), shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, and so,
you do affirm" - should be administered to all witnesses who indicate a preference
not to be inducted into the witness stand pursuant to either of the above procedures.
The Attorney General's position seems to fully protect the witness, but might it not
possibly prejudice a defendant? Suppose a jury is made up completely of believers
and a witness refuses to swear (this refusal takes place in open court) and wants to
affirm. Might this not make the witness a little less believable to the jury? Since it
seems that believers would be just as likely to tell the truth if they took a more general
oath, why have different oaths? The common law tradition of the oath is strong, but
is not the real purpose to put the witness under the perjury laws? It would seem
reasonable and safer in order to avoid the possibility in the future of chaos similar to
that that developed after Schowgurow, to have one oath for all witnesses.
9. See The Evening Sun (Baltimore), Oct. 18, 1965, p. B24, col. 1.
10. In Schiller v. Lefkowitz, 242 Md. 461, 219 A.2d 378 (1966), the court held
that while the rule of Schowgurow applies to civil cases, it does not apply retroactively
even to those cases not finalized prior to the date of Schowgurow.
11. Ralph v. Brough, 248 F. Supp. 334 (D. Md.) (1965). This contention was
answered by the de facto argument discussed infra, note 13.
12. This exception to the hearsay rule requires that the declarant believe in the
life hereafter. The only reason to suppose he is any more reliable just before death
is because it seems that a person who believed he would soon "meet his maker" would
be less likely to tell a lie. If he does not believe in the hereafter, there is no reason
to think he would be any more trustworthy just before death. This seems to be a valid
rule of evidence, and it is highly doubtful that a non-believer is prejudiced by it.
13. Somewhat related to retroactivity is the argument of counsel in Smith v. State,
240 Md. 464, 214 A.2d 563 (1965), that since the grand jury was unconstitutionally
composed, the indictment was defective and the court could not obtain jurisdiction. The
effect of the argument, if successful, would have been to render all convictions prior to
the Schowgurow decision null and void. This argument was predicated upon a long
line of decisions commencing with State v. Williams, 5 Md. 82 (1853), and Bruce v.
Cook, 6 Gill & J. 345 (1834). Those cases indicate that a defective indictment gives
the court no jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals answered this contention by stating
that a defective indictment was "voidable and not void" and thus could be waived. It is
submitted, therefore, that the portion of State v. Williams under discussion has been
impliedly overruled. If a defective indictment can be waived, it is an admission that a
defective indictment may give jurisdiction, since jurisdiction usually cannot be waived.
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The problem of retroactivity, discussed briefly in Schowgurow,
has recently been considered specifically by Judge Thomsen of the
Federal District Court for the District of Maryland in the cases of
18 All
Smith v. Brough,14 Ralph v. Brough 5 and Brown v. 1Brough.
of
7
petitions.
corpus
habeas
on
brought
were
cases
these
In Smith v. Brough the court reached the conclusion that Schowgurow was not retroactive. Judge Thomsen quoted from the Schowgurow opinion: "In the many difficult questions of constitutional law
arising from criminal trials, the protection of the rights of the individual
is weighed against the protection of society. Both are basic to ordered
liberty. On the matter of retroactivity here involved, the dip of the
scales is obvious."' 8 Using this balancing test to weigh the interest of
society against the interest of the individual, the court allowed the petitioners in Brown and Ralph, which were capital cases, to re-petition
in the state courts under the Maryland Post Conviction Procedure Act.
The court indicated there was some question whether a man's being
under penalty of death might alter the "dip of the scales," and it wanted
the state courts to first decide the question.' 9
It is important to note here that in both Schowgurow and the
above cases, the Maryland Court of Appeals and the Federal District
Court purported to follow the test laid down by the United States
The Court of Appeals cited the case of Kimble v. Bender, 173 Md. 608, 196 Att.
409 (1938), in the Smith opinion. Perhaps a better argument could be based on
that case. There, a justice of the peace was held to be a "de facto" officer though the
statute for his appointment was unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals cited the case
of Norton v. Shelby County, Tenn., 118 U.S. 425 (1886), which enunciates a principle
particularly applicable to Schowgurow. The Court in Norton laid down a limitation
upon the rule that where an office is itself legal and the statute for selection of the
officer is unconstitutional, still the officer, if selected under color of law, is a "de facto"
officer, and his acts prior to the declaration of unconstitutionality are valid. The doctrine of Norton has been used in a number of criminal cases. Most of these cases
involved the validity of acts of a judge where the statute for selection or appointment
has been declared unconstitutional. Maryland has followed Norton in a number of
cases. See, e.g., Reed v. President of North East, 226 Md. 229, 172 A.2d 536 (1961);
Izer v. State, 77 Md. 110, 26 Atl. 282 (1893).
Applying the Norton rule to jurors, it is evident that their acts prior to the
declaration of unconstitutionality of article 36 are valid and that their indictments
therefore conferred jurisdiction. This rule will apply assuming that the jurors were
selected under color of law and that their position is considered to be an office. There
is no doubt that the position of a juror is an office, for as the Maryland court stated
in Schowgurow, "A grand or petit juror serves in an office of trust (apart from
profit)." 240 Md. 121, 125, 213 A.2d 475, 478 (1965).
The effect of the theory of waiver and that of the "de facto" officer are much the
same. The distinction, however, is that in the former the court must abandon the rule
that a defective indictment gives a court no jurisdiction, while in the latter the rule
is maintained. If the rule has been abandoned, serious difficulties with the rule of
former jeopardy may result.
For a good discussion of the "de facto" theory as applied to judges, see Judge
Thomsen's opinion in Ralph v. Brough, 248 F. Supp. 334 (D. Md. 1965).
14. 248 F. Supp. 435 (D. Md. 1965).
15. 248 F. Supp. 334 (D. Md. 1965).
16. 248 F. Supp. 342 (D. Md. 1965).
17. In a case under the Maryland Post Conviction Procedure Act, Hamm v.
Warden, 240 Md. 725, 214 A.2d 141 (1965), the Court of Appeals in dicta upheld its
decision regarding the retroactivity of Schowgurow. The Court ruled that the question
was not properly before the court because the petitioner had not properly raised the
point in the lower court, but said that it nevertheless would have been unavailing. See
also Husk v. Warden, 240 Md. 353, 214 A.2d 139 (1965).
18. 240 Md. 121, 134, 213 A.2d 475, 484 (1965).
19. For discussion of the problems raised by this approach, see infra note 54 and
accompanying text.
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Supreme Court in the case of Linkletter v. Walker."° In that case the
Supreme Court held the exclusionary rule of Mapp v. Ohio2 not to be
retroactive. The Linkletter opinion stated that retroactivity should be
governed by "the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and
effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard
its operation.""2
Although the result in Schowgurow was proper, the statement of
the rule as a weighing of the interests of the individual against the
interests of society may be misleading. The analysis which follows
hopefully shows that the correct test for retroactivity deals more with
the nature and amount of prejudice to the defendant than with the
weighing of the individual's rights against those of society.23 Only
where there is some substantial doubt as to whether the defendant's
right to a fair trial has been prejudiced should the society's interest
in administrative convenience be weighed. If the District Court in
Brown and Ralph had been applying this more specific rule, rather than
the vague balancing of interests test, it is doubtful that it would have
concluded that there may be other factors to be weighed when the
death penalty is involved. 4
THE PURPOSE OF Schowgurow AND
RETROACTIVE APPLICATION

The purpose of the Schowgurow decision was twofold: first, to
insure the defendant of his first amendment right by eliminating discriminatory laws based upon theism or non-theism; second, to protect
the integrity of the fact-finding process, i.e., to insure as nearly as
possible the finding of truth by eliminating any possibility of a prejudiced or biased jury resulting from discriminatory state laws. 5 Would
these purposes be furthered by a retroactive application of its rule?
20. 381 U.S. 618 (1965). This is the leading case to date on the problem of retroactivity. Its application was limited to cases not finalized at the time of its decision.
21. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). In this case the Supreme Court held that the exclusion
of evidence seized in violation of the search and seizure provisions of the fourth
amendment was required in state cases by the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.
22. 381 U.S. 618, 629 (1965).
23. The Supreme Court in Johnson v. New Jersey, 34 U.S.L. Wz4K 4592, 4595
(U.S. June 21, 1966) (No. 49) said: "Finally, we emphasize that the question whether
a constitutional rule of criminal procedure does or does not enhance the reliability of
the fact-finding process at trial is necessarily a matter of degree."
24. In Schowgurow the Court of Appeals pointed out that neither the Constitution
nor the Supreme Court has spoken finally on the problem of retroactivity. In Great
Northern R. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358, 364 (1932), Mr. Justice
Cardozo said that a state "may make a choice for itself between the principle of forward
operation and that of relation backward." See also Chicot County Drainage Dist. v.
Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371 (1940).
25. That these are the purposes is adequately supported by an examination of the
opinion. In Schowgurow the court stated, 240 Md. at 131:
Under the decision of the Supreme Court in Torcaso, we are constrained to hold
that the provisions of the Maryland Constitution requiring demonstrations of
belief in God as a qualification for service as a grand or petit juror are in violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that any requirement of an oath as to such
belief, or inquiry of prospective jurors, oral or written, as to whether they believe
in a Supreme Being, is unconstitutional.
In Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 496 (1961), the Supreme Court held: "This
Maryland religious test for public office unconstitutionally invades the appellants
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In the Linkletter decision the Supreme Court said that the retroactive application of the Mapp rule would not further its purpose,
which they thought was to restrain police officers from making illegal
searches and seizures. The following questions, therefore, must be
analyzed: first, would the protection of first amendment rights be
furthered by its retroactive application; secondly, would the integrity
of the fact-finding process be enhanced by its retroactive application?
On the surface it would appear that any decision concerning individual rights protected by the Constitution would be furthered by
its retroactive application. This point of view has been ably argued by
many legal writers.26 But an examination of the cases indicates that
the Supreme Court, despite its apparent recent concern with individual
rights, does not make rules retroactive on this ground. The fact that
an individual's rights have been violated is a good ground for making
the decision in the first place and for making it the law for the future,
but it is not necessarily a reason for applying the rule to the past. The
leading cases in which the Supreme Court has allowed retroactive
application of a rule - Griffin v. Illinois,27 Eskridge v. Washington,"
Gideon v. Wainwright29 and Jackson v. Derno ° - were decided in
the way they were, not so much because an individual's rights were
violated, but because a serious question of the fairness and verity of
the trial was raised. The Supreme Court has apparently never given
retroactive application to a rule based on infringement of individual
rights alone.
In Tehan v. United States,3' which involved the right against selfincrimination, the Court recently stated its position as follows:
As in Mapp, therefore, we deal here with a doctrine which rests
on considerations of quite a different order from those underlying
other recent constitutional decisions which have been applied retroactively. The basic purpose of a trial is the determination of truth,
and it is self-evident that to deny a lawyer's help through the
technical intricacies of a criminal trial or to deny a full opportunity
to appeal a conviction because the accused is poor is to impede
freedom of belief and religion and therefore cannot be enforced against him." The
combination of these two cases adequately demonstrates that one of the primary
motivations of the Court of Appeals in deciding Schowgurow was the protection of
religious liberty. Further, in 240 Md. at 125 the Court of Appeals said: "In Maryland,
both grand and petit jurors are an integral part of our judicial system; they are regarded as fundamental safeguards to individual liberty, and, in their deliberation, each
member exercises a part of the sovereign power of government in the administration
of justice." It is thought that this statement along with the Maryland court's discussion
of other selective exclusion cases and its presumption of prejudice for purposes of
standing (See Smith v. Brough, 248 F. Supp. 435 [1965]) adequately demonstrates
the other purpose of the Schowgurow decision - the protection of the integrity of the
fact-finding process, the protection of our judicial system as one which is devoted to
the finding of truth.
26. See, e.g., Note, Prospective Overruling and Retroactive Application in the
Federal Courts, 71 YALE L.J. 907 (1962) ; and Torcia & King, The Mirage of Retroactivity and Changing Constitutional Concepts, 66 DICK. L. Rxv. 269 (1962).

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

351
357
372
378
382

U.S. 12 (1956).
U.S. 214 (1958).
U.S. 335 (1963).
U.S. 368 (1964).
U.S. 406 (1966).
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that purpose and to infect a criminal proceeding with the clear
danger of convicting the innocent. .

.

. By contrast, the Fifth

Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination is not an adjunct
to the ascertainment of truth. That privilege, like the guarantees
of the Fourth Amendment, stands as a protection of quite different
of our society
constitutional values - values reflecting the concern
32
for the right of each individual to be let alone.
The Tehan decision held against retroactive application. But the
question has been asked: Why not make it retroactive on the basis of
the individual's rights alone? Mr. Justice Black, joined by Mr. Justice
Douglas, in his dissent in Linkletter seemed to feel that the Mapp rule
should apply to cases finalized prior to the Mapp decision simply because
that case involved an individual's constitutionally protected right:
As the Court concedes

. . .

this is the first instance on record where

this Court, having jurisdiction, has ever refused to give a previously convicted defendant the benefit of a new and more expansive
Bill of Rights interpretation. I am at a loss to understand why
those who suffer from the use of evidence secured by a search and
seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment should be treated
differently from those who have been denied other guarantees of
the Bill of Rights. 8
This point of view cannot be answered to everyone's satisfaction. It
could be argued that if the defendant did not raise and argue the right
in question at his trial, he waived this right. This is a fictional line of
thinking; a person cannot waive an unknown right. The problem lies
in the fact that an individual right cannot be divorced from the interests
of society, i.e., that society has an interest in seeing that every person
has his rights protected. However, society also has an interest in maintaining predictability in the administration of a judicial system under
which the guilty remain in jail. In addition, once an individual right
has been violated by an illegal search and seizure or by a coerced confession, retroactivity will not correct the personal wrong. Therefore, it
seems fair to say that the violation of an individual's rights should not
produce retroactivity unless the violation was so great as to seriously
challenge the reliability of the trial, e.g., as in Gideon.
It is thus apparent that the Supreme Court will make a rule retroactive only when there is a great possibility of prejudice to the integrity
of the fact-finding process which places the finding of truth in serious
doubt. In the present situation, although the defendant's individual
rights were violated by article 36 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights,
the overall purposes inherent in our legal system - fairness, consistency,
and reliability - would not be served by making the Schowgurow
rule retroactive.
In Griffin v. Illinois4 the Supreme Court held that the denial of an
appeal to indigent defendants solely because of their inability to obtain
32. Id. at 416.
33. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 646 (1965).
34. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
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a transcript was a denial of the equal protection of laws guaranteed
by the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution. The
Court reasoned that Illinois' prior recognition of the right of appeal as
an essential part of its judicial system, precluded it from affirming its
necessity in some cases and not in others. Griffin was given retroactive
operation by the Illinois Supreme Court. 5 In Eskridge v. Washington8 6
the state had adopted the same unconstitutional procedure which had
been condemned in Illinois. In that case the Supreme Court, though
not discussing retroactivity, granted petitioner relief on federal habeas
corpus though his case had become final before the Griffin decision was
rendered. This ruling also gave Griffin retroactive operation.
3 7 was
The defendant in Gideon v. Wainwright
denied courtappointed counsel in a criminal proceeding. The Supreme Court held
that the denial of counsel in such a case was a fundamental denial of
due process of law in derogation of the fourteenth amendment. This
case, like Eskridge, was decided on federal habeas corpus, and thus
as a practical matter was made retroactive, though retroactivity was
not discussed.
The Gideon Court recognized that the existence
of counsel was an essential part of our fact-finding process - the
adversary system.
In Jackson v. Denno,9 the New York procedure in question left
to the jury the determination of the voluntariness of confessions. The
Supreme Court held that the admissibility of an involuntary or coerced
confession would be highly prejudicial to the accused and a fundamental
denial of due process of law contrary to the fourteenth amendment.
Again, this case was brought before the Court on federal habeas corpus
and had retroactive effect. Underlying the Court's statements existed
the tacit assumption that coerced confessions are inherently suspect and
untrustworthy. The Court thus realized that a coerced confession must
be excluded from the jury, the objectivity of which is an essential part
of our judicial system.
The Supreme Court in Mapp v. Ohio4 ° held that evidence, unlawfully seized, was inadmissable in the prosecution of the accused. The
fourth amendment prohibition of unlawful search and seizures was
thus applied to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. As discussed earlier, that case was held to be not
retroactive in Linkletter v. Walker 4 where the Court said that their
underlying reasoning in the Mapp decision was that, in order to prevent
the police from violating the fourth amendment right in order to
obtain convictions, it was necessary to apply the exclusionary rule to
the states, other state methods of preventing such unlawful actions
having failed. It is apparent that the Mapp Court simply wanted to
35. People v. Griffin, 9 Ill. 2d 164, 137 N.E.2d 485 (1956).

36. 357 U.S. 214 (1958).
37. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
38. The Maryland Court of Appeals held Gideon to be retroactive in Manning v.
State, 237 Md. 349, 206 A.2d 563 (1965). See 25 MD. L. Rxv. 355 (1965).
39. 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
40. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
41. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
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protect the rights of individual defendants and to prohibit unlawful
violation of those rights by the police.
In Griffin v. California42 the Supreme Court held that a prosecutor's
or judge's comment on the accused's failure to testify was violative
of the defendant's fifth amendment protection against self-incrimination. A comment, as distinguished from a confession, is not evidentiary
in nature. The right against self-incrimination was made applicable
to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment in Malloy v. Hogan.43 Griffin was held to be not retroactive in
Tehan v. United States.4 ' The Tehan Court indicated that the Griffin
decision was based upon the determination of the desirability of protecting an accused's right against self-incrimination. It then pointed
out that this fifth amendment right was designed to prevent invasions
of privacy and to require the prosecution to bear the burden of conviction in our accusatorial system. The Court denied, however, any relationship between the fifth amendment right and a finding of truth.
In Johnson v. New Jersey,15 the Supreme Court held that the
rules of Escobedo"6 and Miranda 7 should not apply retroactively.
Escobedo held, at least, that statements made by the accused while being
interrogated by police after having been refused counsel were inadmissible." Miranda extended the rule of Escobedo by requiring police
to advise an accused that he has a right to remain silent, that anything
he says may be used against him, that he has a right to an attorney,
and that he has a right to a court-appointed attorney if indigent. As in
Tehan, the Court said, "the prime purpose of these rulings is to guarantee full effectuation of the privilege against self-incrimination." 49
In addition, contrary to Jackson v. Denno,5 0 there was an independent
determination of voluntariness wherein the statements were found to be
voluntary. This being so, the presumption against truthfulness would
not lie.
When these cases are placed in juxtaposition, it is evident that
retroactivity depends upon the degree to which the fact-finding process
was influenced by the various unconstitutional practices.5 1
Schowgurow, as far as insuring the integrity of the fact-finding
process is concerned, falls between Linkletter, which involved illegal
search, and Tehan, which involved comment on failure to testify, and
is probably closer to Linkletter. There is some possibility of detriment
to that process when a class is excluded from the jury, but certainly the
possibility is slight in this case; for a man's religion, in contrast to his
race, is not self-evident. The fact that Buddhists were or were not
members of the jury would cast little doubt upon the finding of truth,
and therefore the rule of Schowgurow should not be retroactive.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

380 U.S. 609 (1965).
378 U.S. 1 (1964).
382 U.S. 406 (1966).
34 U.S.L. WtPK 4592 (U.S. June 21, 1966) (No. 49).
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
Miranda v. Arizona, 34 L.W. 4521 (1966).
See, 75 Mn. L. lev. 165 (1965).
34 U.S.L. WEK, supra note 45, at 4595.
Jackson v. Denno, supra note 39.
Johnson v. New Jersey, supra note 23.
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It is clear that a rule should be made retroactive where the practice which the rule is correcting produces a serious doubt as to the
integrity of the fact-finding process. However, where the purpose of
the rule is not clear, the burden which retroactive operation would place
upon the administration of the courts and the history of the prior rule
may have to be considered.
ADMINISTRATIVE

AND

HISTORICAL

CONSIDERATIONS

Many may submit that administrative difficulties are the most
important considerations in determining retroactivity. So far as policy
is concerned, this may be true. Certainly Mr. Justice Black suggested in
his dissent in Linkletter v. Walker that the majority was enunciating a
departure from retrospective operation in part upon the basis of administrative difficulties.52 The necessity of re-indicting and re-trying all
persons presently convicted of crimes, the expense and time which would
be entailed, and the obstruction which retrospective operation would
place in the path of the development of new law and in the path of
litigants seeking relief in other cases must, of course, be considered.
In Tehan v. United States, Mr. Justice Stewart in his majority
opinion refers to the "effect on the administration of justice" as the "last
important factor" to be considered in determining retrospective operation.53 But it seems that the Supreme Court has not adopted a policy of
refusing retroactivity on administrative grounds where the purpose is
to insure the fairness of the fact-finding process.
There may, of course, be an acceptable method of applying the
administrative argument. It is submitted that whether such an application is acceptable is governed by the interests placed in balance. It
has been suggested that the determination of retroactivity might include
the weighing of the gravity of the sentence.54 This result would occur
when weighing the interests of society in the administration of the
courts against the interests of individual prisoners. Such a weighing
of interests presents many problems, but the following are strikingly
evident: first, it would be difficult to determine the gravity of sentence
which would demand retroactive operation; and second, there would
seem to be little justification for a rule which predicates the existence of
a fundamental denial of due process upon the severity of the sentence
and the crime committed - murderers ought not to have a right which
petty thieves do not.
On the other hand, if the interests balanced are those of society in
the smooth administration of the courts and those of society in a legal
system which perpetuates a finding of truth, a proper result may be
reached. Where no question of truth is involved, the administrative
difficulties obviously outweigh all other considerations. 5 5 Where the
52. 381 U.S. 618, 640 (1965).
53. 382 U.S. 406, 418 (1966).
54. See note 19 supra and accompanying text. In Ralph v. Brough, 248 F. Supp.
334 (D. Md. 1965) and Brown v. Brough, 248 F. Supp. 342 (D. Md. 1965), the District
Court felt that there may be other interests to be considered when a petitioner is under
sentence of death.
55. See, e.g., Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
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purpose of the rule contended to be retroactive is obviously to protect a
finding of truth, no administrative difficulties would override the mandate of retrospective operation which such a rule presents.5" But where
the purpose is debatable, as in Tehan v. United States,57 - that is,
where the purpose of protecting the integrity of the fact-finding process
cannot necessarily be said to be the overriding consideration - administrative difficulties may require retrospective operation only insofar as it
applies to cases not final. The administrative considerations may persuade the court to say that the purpose of the decision was only to protect individual constitutional rights - not a finding of truth.
It has already been determined that the primary purpose of Schowgurow clearly was to guarantee the freedom of religion or non-religion
specified in the first amendment of the federal constitution, rather
than guarantee the integrity of the fact-finding process, and this being
so, any discussion of administrative difficulties is unnecessary. If
this were not the case, however, the history of the prior rule would
be pertinent. 5s
The importance of historical analysis, in the absence of a clear
indication of purpose, lies primarily in its use in determining whether
a state was justified in maintaining the unconstitutional practice. If
56. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
57. Tehan v. United States, supra note 53.
58. If the history were pertinent, however, it is thought that Maryland was well
justified in its position. The Supreme Court has never said that all exclusions from
jury service are unconstitutional. On the contrary, in Strauder v. West Virginia, 100
U.S. 303, 310 (1879), the Court said that a state may make discriminations in jury
selection within the limits of the fourteenth amendment. In Ex Parte Virginia, 100
U.S. 339, 345 (1879), the Court took an even more limited view of its power in relation
to the exclusion of a class from jury service. The Court said that the fourteenth
amendment had expanded the power of Congress and that Congress should enforce
it by legislation; the courts should not declare state laws void when Congress had acted.
Congress has only acted in the Civil Rights Act of 1875 (now 18 U.S.C. 243) where
"race, color, or previous condition of servitude" are disallowed as qualifications
for jurors.
While it is not contended here that only Congress can implement the fourteenth
amendment in selective exclusion cases, it is submitted that both Strauder and Ex
Parte Virginia are representative of the Supreme Court's inclination to allow the states
to judge what exclusions were reasonable - at least prior to 1905 when State v.
Mercer, 101 Md. 535, 61 Atl. 220 (1905) was decided by the Maryland Court of Appeals.
Mercer is the only case which raised the point in Maryland prior to Schowgurow.
Though the constitutionality of article 36 was not in question in that case, the court
showed little reluctance in stating that the provision meant exactly what it said - that
no one would be competent as a juror in this state who did not believe in the existence
of God.
It is further submitted that the Court of Appeals could honestly believe at that
time that exclusion of non-believers was reasonable. In the first place, while the
Supreme Court had banned exclusion on the basis of race, a man's race is obvious to
the jury but his religion is not. Secondly, and probably of more importance, the
Maryland rule of selection seems to have been carried over from the common law
distinction between the ability of believers and non-believers to testify honestly.
In Torcaso v. Watkins, 223 Md. 49, 161 A.2d 438 (1960), a case which the
United States Supreme Court later reversed, the Court of Appeals held that a person,
who was appointed a notary public and who was refused office because of his refusal
to state a belief in the existence of God as required by article 37 of the Declaration of
Rights, was not deprived of any of his rights under the federal constitution. It was
not until they were reversed by the Supreme Court in Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S.
488 (1961), that the Maryland courts knew that exclusion based upon the disbelief in
God were unconstitutional. The Maryland Court of Appeals acted as quickly as
possible after Torcaso, declaring article 36 unconstitutional in Schowgurow, the first
case which raised the issue.
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the state courts had reason to know that the proscribed practice was
unconstitutional, and yet continued to uphold it, there may be some
justification for disregarding administrative considerations. This is so
because a state ought not to be able to rely upon administrative difficulties where there is an absence of surprise. The difficulties are of the
state's own making since its courts continued to follow that which they
knew or should have known to be unconstitutional. But if the state
could not have known the practice to be unconstitutional, there may not
be a justification for disregarding administrative considerations, particularly if it be assumed that the state has an interest in convicting and
punishing the guilty defendant and that this interest has become vested
by the finding of guilt." In other words, where the overriding purpose
of the rule cannot fairly be said to be the protection of the integrity of
the fact-finding process, an absence of historical justification for the
perpetuation of the prior rule may cause the court to disregard administrative considerations in a determination of retrospective operation and
apply any doubt in favor of retroactivity.

CONCLUSION

The Maryland Court of Appeals stated that Schowgurow should
not be retroactive. This is the proper result; for a careful application
of the test for retroactivity as set out in Linkletter and Tehan indicates
that there was little possibility of prejudice to the defendant, and that
the primary purpose of the decision was not to insure the integrity of
the fact-finding process. Only in the close cases, such as Tehan, need
the administrative and historical aspects of the test be considered in
any detail.
59. In the Linkletter opinion, 381 U.S. at 636, the majority seemed to say that the
states have a "vested interest" in upholding convictions made under the doctrine of

Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), which was overturned by Mapp, 367 U.S. 643

(1961). In his dissent in Linkletter, Mr. Justice Black stated that the majority rested
their opinion on the "vested interest" theory. 381 U.S. at 653. This theory appears
to have been used first by the Supreme Court in Chicot County Drainage District v.

Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 374 (1940).

